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1. Introduction
Financial credits, either internal or external to the firms, tend to be of major im-
portance for their export decisions.1 Entering export markets typically involves
large start-up costs (Arkolakis, 2011; Aw et al., 2011; Dai and Yu, 2013, Chaney,
2016; Bai, et al., 2017), as firms need to collect and analyze information on for-
eign markets, adapt products and packaging to fit foreign preferences, learn local
bureaucratic procedures for market access, set up distribution networks and ad-
vertize for marketing penetration. The start-up costs in international markets are
usually huge, and hence financial credit is more important for exporters than non-
exporters. Feenstra et al. (2014), for instance, address how the “time-to-ship”
feature of exporting generates more uncertainty and reflects more incomplete in-
formation, and hence exporters rely more on financial credits.2 In this paper, we
attempt to investigate different roles played by financial credits on indirect ex-
porters and exporters that switch their exporting mode from indirect to direct
exporting.3
With the availability of micro firm-level data, a growing body of recent liter-
ature starts to examine the link between financial credits and firm-level export
performance (e.g.,Campa and Shaver, 2002; Greenaway et al., 2007; Berman and
1Here, “financial credits” refers to the resources that a firm could rely on to finance for a
broad range of economic activities, such as investment, working capital, and entry of international
markets. The credits could be either internal, like firms’ retained earnings, or external, like loans
from outside creditors.
2More specifically, as suggested by Amiti and Weinstein (2011), there exits a longer time lag
between exporting products and receiving sales revenue (i.e. longer “time to ship” for exports)
and exporters also face intrinsically more uncertainty due to the difficulty with enforcing payment
across borders.
3Following Bai, et al. (2017), we refer to exporting through intermediaries as indirect ex-
porting mode.
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He´ricourt, 2010; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Manova, 2013; Manova et al., 2015; Chan-
ney, 2016; ). Greenaway et al.,(2007), for example, find that financial health has
a trivial effect on firm-level export participation decision in the UK, while a firm’s
export participation decision can significantly improve this firm’s financial health.
Berman and He´ricourt (2010), to the contrary, document that the firm-level exter-
nal and internal financial health effectively promote firms’ export extensive margin,
although their effect on the intensive margin is negligible. Minetti and Zhu (2011)
find that financial rationing reduces firm-level exports on both extensive margin
and intensive margin by employing data from the Italian manufacturing sector.
The discrepant conclusions are partly caused by the heterogeneous influence of
financial credits on different firms. Manova et al. (2015) show that financial
constraints have a more pronounced impact on low-productivity firms, and firms
belonging to financially vulnerable sectors. Jarreau and Poncet (2014) indicate
that the export performance of foreign-owned firms and joint ventures relies more
on their own financial credits than private domestic firms in China.
In this paper, we are primarily exploring the heterogeneous influence of financial
credits on firms that are engaged in indirect (export through intermediaries) and
direct export. Further, we attempt to study how China’s WTO (World Trade
Organization) accession varies the impact of financial credits on firms that switch
from indirect to direct export (the time-varying impact). As discussed in Bai et
al., (2017), indirect and direct exporters exhibit very different cost structures, and
productivity and demand evolution is more favorable under the direct exporting
mode. Specifically, direct exporters, who engage in frequent contact with foreign
buyers, have more opportunity to improve their productivity and demand stock
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(e.g. Egan and Mody, 1992).4 This may suggest a more efficient financial credit
utilization among direct exporters. As such, relative to indirect exporters, we
expect a large impact financial credits have on exporters that switch their exporting
mode from indirect to direct exporting. Besides, Khandelwal et al. (2013) indicate
that for textile and cloth sector, the gains from quota removal mainly arise from
the elimination of quota misallocation rather than trade itself. If the export license
is also misallocated before China’s WTO accession, we expect a more pronounced
impact of financial credits on switchers in the post-WTO accession period.5
China offers an ideal setting to conduct this research in two aspects. First, it
relaxed regulation on firms’ manner of trade, especially exporting modes to fulfill
its WTO membership commitment during 2001-2004. More specifically, before
China joined the WTO, small firms with low registered capital (or sales, exporting
values, etc.) had to rely on state-owned exporting intermediaries to export abroad
(indirect export) due to the regulation on direct trading rights. When China
became a member of the WTO, the accession clauses required that all firms should
be permitted to export directly (direct export). We observe a substantial number
of firms, especially private domestic firms, switching their exporting mode from
indirect to direct export (see Figure 1 in the Appendix).
Second, in China, severe export distortion and resource misallocation exist
(Khandelwal et al., 2013; Hsieh and Klenow,2009). A considerable share of high-
4Egan and Mody (1992) demonstrate that a collaborative suppler-buyer relationship, on the
one hand, improves exporters’ learning-by-exporting efficiency; on the other hand, the buyers
are less likely to change suppliers, which make investment in demand stock more effective.
5If the export licenses were misallocated before China’s WTO accession, the switchers in the
post-WTO accession period would exhibit higher export expanding potential as they are more
productive, and hence, they can better utilize financial credits to support their in expanding
product scope, production capacity or R&D investment.
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productivity firms are prevented from direct exporting before China’s WTO ac-
cession because of their small scale. Export licenses were more favoring large and
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) before China’s WTO accession (see Khandelwal
et al., 2013). As a result, China’s WTO accession/deregulation offers a quasi-
natural experiment to examine the degree of export distortion through uncovering
the time-varying impact of financial credits.6
Using a comprehensive data set covering all Chinese export firms, we find
supporting evidence. First, by employing a difference-in-differences (DID) esti-
mation approach, we find that a 10% increase in the firm-level internal (resp.
external) finance will on average lead to a 4.33% (resp. 2.93%) more increase
in switchers’ (treatment group) export values relative to indirect exporters (con-
trol group). Meanwhile, a 10% increase in the firm-level internal (resp. external)
finance will on average improve the productivity of the switchers by 0.78% (re-
sp. 0.66%)) more than indirect exporters. Second, to examine the time-varying
influence of financial credits on the export performance of switchers, we employ
a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) method. The results demonstrate
that conditioning a firm switching from indirect to direct exporting, a 10% in-
crease in the firm-level internal (resp. external) finance will on average lead to a
6.18% to 38.97% (resp. 26.24% to 86.83%) more increase in export values after
China’s WTO accession.7 The main findings remain when we use instrumental
6As our paper discusses the role of finance in the context of switching exporting modes (either
indirect or direct exporters), we are excluded from talking about the extensive margin of exports
(such as selection into exporting, product scope, number of destinations, and sales within each
destination-product market). Thus, only the intensive margin of trade is investigated in this
paper.
7Notice that financial credits do not exhibit increasing importance on switchers’ productivity.
This is partly because, in the post-WTO accession period, switchers are more productive (see
Figure 1 in the Appendix for more information). Lileeva and Trefler, (2010) find that productivity
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variable methods to account for the potential endogeneity issues associated with
firms switching in exporting modes.8
We further examine the channel through which financial credits manifest het-
erogeneous influence. The results show that switchers have a higher efficiency in
finance usage than indirect exporters.9 In addition, China’s WTO accession fur-
ther improves the efficiency of finance usage for switchers. The different efficiency
in finance usage offers a possible interpretation for the heterogeneous influence of
financial credits on firms’ export performance.
Our work is closely related to Manova (2013) and Manova et al. (2015), in
which the authors find a significant impact of financial credits on firm-level export
performance. The impact is more pronounced for less productive firms and firms
that belong to more financially vulnerable sectors. Differing from Manova (2013)
and Manova, et al. (2015), we emphasize the heterogeneous influence of financial
credits on firms that are engaged in different exporting modes. This study implic-
itly uncovers another source which results in heterogeneous influence of financial
credits on firm-level export performance: firms’ exporting mode (cost structure)
or efficiency in finance usage. Our story is also in line with Bai et al. (2017),
in which they examine how the exporting mode (direct or indirect export) affects
firm-level export performance, and provide a theoretical foundation on the firm-
level heterogeneous performance under different exporting modes. However, our
growth is declining in the firm-level initial productivity. As such, these later more productive
switchers exhibit a slower productivity growth, which makes financial credits less important in
boosting firm-level productivity increase.
8In particular, we instrument the switching in exporting mode variable with the product of
the firm-level initial productivity and province-level aggregate capital shock.
9Switchers have a higher efficiency in finance usage in terms of a lower current liquidity ratio,
higher inventory turnover ratio, and short operation cycle.
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work distinguishes itself from Bai et al. (2017) by paying particular attention to
the time-varying impact of financial credits on switchers. The statistically signifi-
cant time-varying impact, on the one hand, suggests export license misallocation
among Chinese exporters before China’s WTO accession; on the other hand, it im-
plies an increasing role that an effective financial market plays in boosting exports
of China.10 The conclusions further relate our study to Khandelwal et al. (2012)
and Klenow and Hsieh (2009), who both emphasize the resource misallocation and
distortion in China, which are of nontrivial influence on welfare. Khandelwal, et
al., (2012), for instance, show that most gains from trade in China are through
the alleviation of distortion. If the diminishing distortion is the underlying source
that increases the importance of financial credits on firm-level exports, gains from
trade might have been underestimated.11 All existing models do not account for
the effect of trade liberalization on eliminating distortions, which further increases
the effectiveness of the financial market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces information
on policy and institutional background, especially how the regulation on export-
ing modes evolved over the period 2001-2004 in China. We also discuss how to
construct the matched dataset and provide some summary statistics in Section
2. In Section 3, we talk about the construction of key variables and empirical
methodology utilized to conduct statistical inference. Section 4 presents baseline
empirical results and several robustness checks. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
10According to Bai et al. (2017), if there is no distortion, a time-invariant impact of financial
credits on firm-level exports should be identified, since the cost structure difference between
direct and indirect exporters are unchanged.
11Gains from trade are only 6% from Arkolakis, et al., (2012) and slightly larger in Melitz and
Redding (2015).
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2. Policy Background and Data Description
We first present institutional background information on the policy change with
regards to restrictions in firm direct exporting rights in China, since it is the
source of the time-varying effects of financial credits on firm exporting that we
are exploring in this paper. We then describe the two data sets we employ in this
study and also explain the procedure by which we construct the matched sample
that we use for the econometric analysis.
2.1. Policy Background
This paper explores the time-varying impact of financial credits on firm exporting
behavior when the firm switches from indirect to direct exporting in the presence
of a macroeconomic policy change primarily induced by China’s WTO accession.
The policy change that we emphasize here is China’s deregulation on firms’ direct
exporting rights.
Ever since adopting the economic reform policy in 1978, China has been in-
tegrating into the global economy at an accelerated pace. However, as a typical
planned (or centralized) economy, China still maintained substantive government
intervention in various markets. The international exporting market was highly
regulated before China’s WTO accession. At the turning point of 1978, less than
20 specialized Foreign Trade Corporations and around 100 subsidiaries of these
corporations dominated Chinese exports with government-issued monopoly trad-
ing rights. If a firm wanted to export abroad at that time, it could only go through
these Foreign Trade Corporations that acted as exporting intermediaries. It means
that only indirect exporting mode was allowed for a typical Chinese firm in that
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period. As the reform and opening-up policy went into effect, China gradually
granted more and more firms to export directly. In 1983, China allowed a few big
state-owned enterprises to trade directly. All foreign-owned firms were granted
direct exporting rights when the Foreign Trade Law was adopted in 1994. Reform
on trading rights was further encouraged when the Chinese exchange rate reform
was launched in 1994 (this reform allowed the previously government-controlled
exchange rate to be partially determined by the market and thus provided incen-
tives for firms to engage in international trade). In 1998, the Chinese State Council
approved the issuing of direct exporting rights to state-owned and private domestic
firms over a threshold size in terms of registered capital or other criteria like sales,
net assets, and prospective exporting values (after January 2001, only the regis-
tered capital remained as the criterion). Yet, the registered capital requirement
was quite demanding in the beginning, around 8.5 million yuan (approximately
1.03 million dollars in 2001) for private domestic firms. Over the 2001-2004 peri-
od, the reform pace accelerated for the second time when China tried to satisfy
the requirements of the WTO accession.12 For example, the registered capital
requirements for private domestic firms to get direct exporting rights decreased
from 8.5 million yuan to 5 million yuan in January 2001, and further reduced to
3 million yuan in July 2001. After China entered the WTO in December 2001,
the requirement dropped to 0.5 million yuan in September 2003, which in practice
means there were almost no restrictions on firm exporting as those who want to
export typically have a higher registered capital than 0.5 million yuan. Finally,
starting from June 2004, the registered capital requirement fell to zero, and the
12To have a more detailed perception of how the reform or policy change was accelerated over
the period 2001-2004, please see Table A.1 in the appendix of Bai et al. (2017).
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restriction was fully removed. Though the registered capital requirement showed
a dramatic drop over the 2001-2004 period for most of China, Special Economic
Zones like Shenzhen and Xiamen were treated differently. To be specific, the regis-
tered capital requirement for Special Economic Zones stayed at a very low level of
2 million yuan ever since 1998, and dropped to 0.5 million yuan in September 2003.
Given this difference, we rule out firms located in Special Economic Zones from
our matched sample, as they were essentially unaffected by the trade deregulation,
especially in the initial years.
It is worthy to mention that even though the restriction on direct exporting
rights was eliminated then, there still exist numerous international trade inter-
mediaries in China, since many small firms are relying on them to export under
optimal decision processes. As discussed by Ahn et al. (2011), the set of inter-
mediary firms could be identified from the ASIP (Annual Survey of Industrial
Production) data set using Chinese characters that have English-equivalent mean-
ings of “importer” “exporter”, and/or “trading” in firms’ name. When the set
is identified, they conclude that intermediaries in China differ along several no-
table dimensions: intermediaries are more likely to engage in both importing and
exporting relative to direct exporters; they could also handle products that span
entirely unrelated sectors; intermediaries have a relative “country” focus, i.e. they
export more products per country. In sum, Chinese intermediaries appear to have
a lower product concentration and export more varieties per country than direct
exporters. Moreover, in terms of underlying specific roles, as Ahn et al. (2011)
suggest, Chinese intermediaries probably provide services ranging from promoting
matches with foreign customers, exploring quality specifications required in foreign
markets, and helping firms adapt their products to the needs of foreign consumer-
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s. More generally, they help firms establish channels to export their products in
destinations where small firms themselves could not cover the massive additional
fixed/variable costs to reach international markets. Comparing direct exporters
and exporters through intermediaries, we expect firms choosing the direct export-
ing mode to experience a better growth path. Firms relying on the intermediary
sector incur a one-time global fixed cost that provides indirect access to all markets
and allows firms to save on market-specific bilateral fixed costs. The disadvantage
is that intermediation results in higher marginal costs of foreign distribution and
fewer opportunities to learning by exporting, which raises the price to foreign con-
sumers. Therefore, the intermediation technology here benefits less productive
firms. Productive direct exporters, though paying market-specific bilateral fixed
costs, are still likely to grow faster and benefit more than indirect ones due to the
future productivity advantage.
In the following sections, when exploring the time-varying impacts of finance
on firm exporting mode changes, we will take into account this policy change by
distinguishing the periods before and after 2002, or 2003, or 2004, because the
main part of the policy change was phased in over the period 2001-2003. The di-
rect exporting mode means both higher fixed/variable costs and more incentive to
invest for future growth, thus providing a better opportunity for the financial cred-
its to make more contributions. Therefore, we expect a more pronounced impact
of financial credits on firm exporting when more private domestic firms switched
from indirect to direct exporting mode, on the ground that direct exporting was
more available for them after the threshold year we choose. 13
13Though the deregulation on direct exporting rights also granted SOEs with smaller registered
capital to serving international markets, in general they will be less likely to engage in direct
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2.2. Data Description
In this paper, we match two separate Chinese micro-level data sets to get the
sample we are employing in the econometric analysis. The first data set is the
Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP) spanning the period 1998-2007.
This survey, which collects annual firm-level data, is conducted by Chinese Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics (NBSC). The data set is quite inclusive, in the sense
that it incorporates all Chinese State-owned Enterprises (SOEs henceforth) and
non-SOEs with annual sales over 5 million yuan (roughly speaking, 650,000 dollars
at that time). In the survey, detailed firm-level information was collected, such as
firms’ geographic location, year of operation (i.e. the age of the firm), ownership
type (state-owned, collective, private, foreign, etc.), employment, production and
sales, balance sheet variables, and tax. As for this research, we focus on sales
(especially exporting sales values) and balance sheet information, from which we
construct exporting and finance variables in the econometric exercise. The second
data set we use is product-level data from Chinese Customs (GACC), which were
collected at a monthly frequency over the period 2000-2006. We add up values
belonging to the same exporting entity over 12 months to obtain firm-level annual
data, and thus, we can match it with the industrial survey data set. The Customs
data cover the universe of transactions going through Chinese Customs, and con-
tain firm-level information like geographic location, ownership type, exporting and
importing variables (values, quantities, and unit prices), type of trade, mode of
shipment, transit country, export destination country, and import source country.
exporting as a result of lower productivity when comparing with private domestic enterprises,
see Khandelwal et al. (2011) as an example for the textile & cloth sector.
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First, we provide basic statistics for each data set. In the firm-level data set,
ASIP, we list statistics of necessary variables to compute firm-level productivity as
well as productivity itself in Table 1.14 We inflate labor share (i.e. the ratio of total
wage payment to value added) to match the number reported in Chinese input-
output tables and national accounts (roughly 50%) as Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
suggest. For the deflators of output, intermediate inputs and capital depreciation
rate, we follow the tables constructed by Brandt et al. (2012). It is worth noting
that when comparing domestically-selling firms to exporting firms, exporters have
larger values of TFPR and value added in Table 1, which is consistent with the
finding in the literature that firms with higher productivity export.15
Basic statistics for the Customs data set are presented in Table 2.16 We notice
that Chinese exporters do expand rapidly during our sample period as Manova and
Zhang (2012) find. During these seven years, the number of exporting firms has
increased from 62,746 to 171,144, which is nearly a 200% gross growth. The average
number of products each exporter shipped aboard, measured by the distinct 10-
digit HS codes, has also increased from 30 to 36.2. Firms, on average, exported
to 6.9 countries in 2000 and this increased to more than 8 countries in 2006. To
some extent, this evidence suggests that joining the WTO has improved Chinese
14More specifically, we calculate the revenue productivity, denoted as TFPR, following the
methodology introduced by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Note also that TFPR is dimensionless in
Table 1.
15In addition to our main focus on the impact of finance on firm exports, we also check
the effect of finance on firm productivity (measured by TFPR) in the empirical analysis because
several studies in the literature suggest that exporting has a positive impact on firm productivity
through learning, see Kraay (1999) on China, Aw et al. (2000) on Taiwan and South Korea,
Girma et al. (2004) on UK, Van Biesebroeck (2006) on sub-Saharan Africa, and De Loecker
(2007, 2013) on Slovenia.
16For the product-level Customs data, we first add up the entries to firm-level by exporting
values. That is, if a firm exports more than one good, we add up the export values of all goods
and then obtain just one entry for that firm.
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firms’ exporting performance in the global market.
Next, we explain the procedure we follow to match the two data sets. Our
strategy is to make use of firms’ Chinese name as the primary common variable
for matching firms in the Customs data set to those in the ASIP dataset. We
construct a concordance based on the identifiers that exist on both sides of the
data: ID in the ASIP data set and party id in the Customs data set by matching
their corresponding Chinese names. As a supplement to the names, we also link
firms’ identifiers if they are sharing the same zip code and telephone number in both
data sets. As such, the matching algorithm proceeds in 4 steps, see Appendices
(Not for Publication) for more details. Using this matching procedure, we generate
93,222 pairs of identifiers during the length of our sample (2000-2006). In terms of
the ASIP data that we are using as the master data set, we are able to match 20%
of the total firms and 58% of the exporters. Our results are also highly comparable
to those of Manova and Yu (2016), who focus on the year of 2005.
Third, using the matched sample, we document summary statistics to gain
some intuition for our econometric analysis in the following sections. To conduc-
t the econometric analysis, we need to distinguish different types of exporters.
Firms, primarily private domestic enterprises (PDEs henceforth), which switched
from indirect to direct exporting under the relaxed WTO regulations, are those
that may have been most helped by an improvement in their financial conditions.
Following Bai et al. (2017), we infer firms’ exporting modes as follows. Firms from
the ASIP data set are tagged as exporters if they report positive exports (other-
wise they are non-exporters), and as direct exporters if they are also observed in
the Customs data set. The fact that we observe the universe of transactions going
through Chinese Customs allows us to tag the remaining exporting firms (those
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which are not observed in the Customs data set) as indirect exporters.17 Firms
that report exports larger than their exports in the Customs data set are exporting
both directly and indirectly and are labeled direct exporters in this paper. Firms
that do not sell domestically are removed from the sample.
In Table 3, we are comparing the three types of firms. Above all, we notice
that the average export value of direct exporters is systematically higher than that
of the indirect exporters over our sample period. Though both exporting values
increased dramatically after 2004, the huge level value difference between them
remained largely unchanged. The persistent difference suggests that switching
from indirect to direct exporting may help firms to grow. This in turn probably
provides firms an incentive to switch exporting modes. Next, aside from direct ex-
porters entering more international markets, we find large productivity differences
between direct exporters and indirect exporters/non-exporters. The average pro-
ductivity difference between direct exporters and indirect exporters is in the range
of 5% to 20%. This is consistent with the literature that more productive firms are
exporting directly as they can afford large additional exporting costs (Ahn et al.,
2011). The average TFPR gap between direct exporters and non-exporters is also
quite large. It lies between 10% and 30% across years. Also, more firms have been
engaged in exporting and more exporters have switched from indirect exporting
into direct exporting. From 2000 to 2006 the percentage of exporters has increased
from 26.6% to 29.3%. In 2000, 10.9% of firms are inferred to be direct exporters,
17A classification bias might show up when direct exporters are misclassified as indirect ex-
porters. This occurs when identical firms that have different Chinese names recorded in the two
data sets are unmatched. By definition, in our sample, those unmatched direct exporters will be
treated in the same way as indirect exporters. This misclassification only renders our estimation
results downward biased, provided that direct exporters are generally more productive and have
a higher degree of exposure to trade than indirect exporters.
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while 14.7% are indirect exporters. However, in 2006, 15.7% of firms are direct
while only 13.5% are indirect. The finding of more direct exporting firms is consis-
tent with Ahn et al. (2011) and Bai et al. (2017), and can probably be explained
by the fact that more productive PDEs are engaged in exporting directly in the
hope of taking advantage of the favorable productivity and demand evolution.
Our identification hinges on the variation in the composition of direct exporters,
which says that more PDEs shall enter the group of direct exporters in the post-
WTO accession period. To see whether more PDEs were participating in direct
exporting after the trade deregulation, we plot in Figure 1 the evolution paths for
the share of private-domestic-enterprise (PDE) direct exporters in the pool of all
direct exporters. It shows that the share of PDE direct exporters had increased
significantly since China’s WTO accession in December 2001. Specifically, the
share of PDE direct exporters within all direct exporters increase from 22% to
more than 45%. It is worthy to notice that the peak of PDE direct exporting
appeared when the regulation was fully lifted. This could be ascribed to the reason
that PDEs that were exempted from regulation in 2001, 2002, or 2003 have planed
to switch but start switching in 2004 after a preparation period. This explanation
holds in general, considering that direct exporting involves such massive costs
and revenue uncertainty that only fairly sizable firms (which were enfranchised in
earlier years) can manage it and it takes time to get prepared. Alvarez and Lo´pez
(2005) also find strong evidence, using Chilean data, supporting the conclusion
that firms consciously prepare for becoming direct exporters. Moreover, Figure 1
displays that the average productivity of new switchers had risen remarkably in
the trade deregulation period. This may suggest that the trade regulation resulted
in substantial misallocation in exporting licenses. When the regulation was lifted,
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the degree of distortion had been alleviated, which led to more productive but
financially constrained PDEs switch into direct exporters, and hence, improved the
average productivity of switchers. Notice that after 2004, the final deregulation
stage, the average productivity of new switchers further increases, which might
suggest that the most productive but initially financial constrained PDEs start
switching into direct exporters.18
As for the accuracy of the matched sample, we also pay attention to the issue
of trade types. In recent work, Bernard et al. (2010, 2012) argue that carry-along
trade is important in the data. This refers to firms who export final goods for other
firms when exporting their own products, thereby acting partially as intermedi-
aries. However, in our benchmark regressions, we do not distinguish between such
firms and those exporting only their own products, since the data per se provide
no direct information for classification.19 We dropped pure intermediaries between
domestic producers and foreign buyers, i.e. those who show up in the Customs
data set but do not report exporting in the survey data.20 Another issue that we
are concerned with is that processing and/or assembly trade is very different from
ordinary trade. The former usually has lower productivities because it is more
unskilled labor intensive, is less capital intensive, and has lower profitability (see
18Lileeva and Trefler (2010) find that initially more productive firms experience a slower
productivity growth through the learning-by-exporting effect. We would expect a smaller pro-
ductivity gain for firms that switch their exporting mode latter, since these firms have a higher
initial productivity.
19We check the robustness of carry-along trade by dropping the firms that have export shares
higher than 25%. The export share is defined as the ratio of export value from the Customs
data to total sales in the ASIP data. When we exclude these carry-along traders, the summary
statistics in Table 3 and our main empirical results are barely changed.
20The Customs data do not label the intermediaries. Ahn et al. (2011) and Manova et al.
(2015) identify them using keywords in firms’ Chinese names, like the Chinese counterparts of
“trade company”, “export-import company”, and so on. We address the issue by following this
identification method and find that our benchmark results stay unchanged to a large extent.
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Dai et al., 2016). Processing firms in China also pay lower fixed cost (due to gov-
ernment intervention), thus firms with low productivity would select into this type
of trade. To guarantee that exporters in our sample are exceptional performers,
which is a consensus in trade literature on heterogeneous firms, we are going to
keep only ordinary trade firms in the empirical analysis.21
3. Variable Construction and Empirical Method-
ology
In this section, we first construct key variables related to firm-level exporting,
finance, and productivity. Then we set up the baseline econometric model to iden-
tify the increased effect and time-varying increased effect of finance in promoting
firm-level export value when the firm switches exporting mode.
3.1. Construction of Key Variables
Before implementing the econometric analysis, we construct the following relevant
measures for our study from the two raw data sets and the matched sample. We
first construct measures of financial credits. There are various ways to measure
internal and external finance based on firms’ balance sheet information. We follow
Berman and He´ricourt (2010) and Guariglia et al. (2011) by defining internal
finance (IFit) as the ratio of cash flows (CFit) over total assets (Ait), i.e. IFit =
CFit
Ait
, since it is a direct measure of the ability of a firm using its own accumulated
21More important, as Bai et al. (2017) point out, the processing and/or assembly trade bear
quite different sunk cost and learning opportunities from ordinary trade and thus it is reasonable
for us to drop them as our topic closely hinges on the cost structure and learning channel.
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liquidity to finance new investment. Like Berman and He´ricourt (2010), we define
external finance (EFit) as the reciprocal of the ratio of total liabilities (Lit) over
total assets, i.e. EFit =
1
Lit/Ait
. It measures the firms’ ability to borrow from
the outside, with a lower liability ratio entailing firms more space to get external
funds.
Then, we estimate firm-level productivity using the method introduced by H-
sieh and Klenow (2009).22 Since we do not have firm-level output price data, we
focus on the “revenue productivity”, i.e. TFPR.23 The estimation of TFPR is con-
ducted using the ASIP data set and the relevant variables for this estimation are
firm-level value added, labor, and capital stock. Next, we define a key measure for
this research, i.e. exporting mode, as a dummy variable that switches value from
0 to 1 when a firm moves from indirect exporting in the previous year to direct
exporting in the current year (note that it takes value 0 when staying as indirect
exporter in the current year). Finally, we obtain measures of export values directly
from the Customs dataset, in which exporting values measure the intensive margin
of firm export.
22To account for the robustness of firm-level productivity measure, we compare it with the
widely used proxy variable methods with semiparametric estimation, including Olley and Pakes
(1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Wooldridge (2009) and Ackerberg et al. (2015). We find
no significant changes relative to our baseline results. To save space, we present only the results
using the method by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). It is nontrivial to mention that all these measures
are revenue based, given the limitation that there is no firm-level output price data.
23There is a concern that the TFPR might not reflect the real movement in firm-level produc-
tivity, thus not acting as an appropriate efficiency measure (See Garcia-Marin and Voigtla¨nder
(2017)). The reason is that TFPR is a combination of output price and physical productivity,
i.e. TFPQ. When output price decreases, an increase in TFPQ might not be accompanied by an
increase in TFPR. That is to say, the efficiency gain will not be captured by TFPR when it is
translated into lower output price for consumers. In our study, this potential measurement issue
will only downward bias the estimated result when physical productivity is available, condition-
ing on the fact revealed in Brandt et al. (2017) that trade liberalization upon China’s WTO
accession induced a drop in output price and more so for direct exporters that are large and
productive.
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3.2. Empirical Methodology
The empirical strategy we employ in this paper are panel data difference-in-
differences (DID henceforth) and difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD hence-
forth) regressions. With divergent cost structures and growth paths between direct
and indirect exporting, Chinese exporters bearing different exporting modes could
serve as an interesting subject for applying the DID methods. To study the en-
couraging effect of firm-level financial credits on export values, we consider firms
that switched from indirect to direct exporting as the treatment group and firms
that continued to use indirect exporting as the control group. During the WTO
accession period, the Chinese government has lowered the registered capital re-
quirement, which then encouraged more PDEs to switch from indirect exporters
to direct ones. The policy change thus provides a quasi-experiment that allows
us to study the impact of trade deregulation on firm export performance. The
impact of switching exporting mode promoted by financial credits on firm-level
export performance might not be time invariant before and after the WTO acces-
sion since the trade deregulation provides better opportunities for financial cred-
its to contribute in direct exporting. To capture the time-varying impact of the
treatment effect promoted by financial credits, we divide the sample to pre- and
post-WTO accession periods to generate cross period difference using the panel
data difference-in-difference-in-differences method.24
First, we want to show that financial credits play a more pronounced role on
firm-level exports for those switch their exporting mode from indirect to direct
24Figure 2 shows a more detailed description of the main idea and contributions of our work.
The treatment is exactly what we define here.
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export. Furthermore, by directly participating in export markets, exporting firms
are more likely to invest in productivity-enhancing activities, and innovate in a
more efficient way. Thus, relative to indirect exporters, financial credits drive a
faster productivity growth for switching firms (see Chen and Guariglia (2013) and
Bai et al. (2017)). Following the research designs of Meyer (1995) and Imbens
and Wooldridge (2007), we conduct our first estimation using an individual-level
panel data difference-in-differences model for multiple time periods:
yit = α + ηj × d200j + τ1 × dExportingmodeit + τ2 × dExportingmodeit × xit
+ zitγ + ci + uit; j = 1, ..., 6. (1)
where yit is the firm-level export or productivity, xit is our measure of financial
credits, and zit are individual-specific controls which include xit. The dummy vari-
able dExportingmodeit captures the change from indirect to direct exporting, it
equals 1 if a firm switches from indirect to direct exporting and equals to 0 if it
remains an indirect exporter.25 The coefficient τ1 captures the average treatment
effect (to be precise, on the treated) of switching the manner of exporting, and τ2
is the average treatment effect further promoted by financial credits. We expect
a significant and positive τ2 for both export values and productivity (TFPR) re-
gressions. We construct time dummies for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
25We define treatment as switching from indirect to direct exporting, and then evaluate rele-
vant economic implication of this treatment. The choice of the treatment is not merely in line
with the theory on the cost and benefit heterogeneity of alternative exporting modes, but also
motivated by our data. It shown in our sample that on average the transition probability from
indirect to direct exporting is double of that from direct to indirect exporting. To be specific,
the average annual transition probability is 6.3% versus 3.5%. Thus, our data suggests that
switching from indirect to direct exporting is a relatively more important than the reverse case,
which also inspires us to focus on this phenomenon in the current study.
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and 2006. The expression ηj × d200j is a linear combination of the time dummies
capturing the aggregate year-specific factors that would influence the change in τ1
or τ2. We estimate the empirical equation above using the fixed effect (FE) pan-
el data method to control for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity ci. However, it
must be noted that in our context the empirical analysis based on the classic panel
data difference-in-differences model might be unreliable since it is subject to an
endogeneity (or self-selection) issue. If a firm’s intensive exporting decision (i.e. to
export more) encourages the firm to switch from indirect to direct exporting, then
the dExportingmodeit variable in the difference-in-differences equation is endoge-
nous and the FE estimation is invalid.26 We address the endogeneity issue using
the instrumental variable approach. Specifically, we instrument the switch in the
exporting mode variable dExportingmodeit with the product of firms’ initial pro-
ductivity and province-level aggregate capital supply shock.27 Exploring the idea
proposed by Jarreau and Poncet (2014), we characterize aggregate capital supply
using a financial market deepening variable, which is the market share of China’s
four biggest state-owned banks (namely, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China,
Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the Agricultural Bank of China) in
26Moreover, a selection problem might occur as a result of our first-differencing calculation
in the FE method, when firms do not disappear from our sample but become unobserved for
some periods (e.g. some firms stop exporting for a few years and re-enter later). Firms that stop
exporting for a few years may not be as productive as constant exporters, thus the probability
of their being observed is correlated with our independent variables, individual effect and the
error term. Yet, the selection problem does not undermine our estimation because it leads to a
downward bias and is less severe if the panel is short, which is just our case.
27A higher firm-level productivity implies a larger profit which covers the cost associated with
entering international market and technology upgrading. We also think a higher regional capital
supply shock might help to ease the financial needs of firm-level export mode switching. We
carefully choose the IV components to reduce their correlations with our independent firm-level
variables. We use firms’ initial period productivity instead of current year productivity to avoid
contemporaneous correlation, and interact it with province-level shocks to further mitigate the
correlation at the firm level.
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total bank credits. A lower market share of these state banks in total bank credits
implies a higher degree of financial market liberalization, and thus more financial
access or capital supply for individual firms.28 Since only province-level informa-
tion on banking credits is available, we construct this variable for each province of
China, thus all firms within a province share the same capital supply shock.
Second, we want to show the time-varying impact of the treatment augmented
by financial credits on export values before and after the trade deregulation. As
suggested by Meyer (1995) on treatment that is of higher-order interactions, we
conduct our difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation for multiple
time periods:
yit = α + ηj × d200j + τ1 × dExportingmodeit + τ2 × dExportingmodei × dWTOt
+ τ3 × dExportingmodeit × dWTOt × xit + zitγ + ci + uit. (2)
In the DDD regression, we are interested in the triple interaction term of fi-
nance, treatment (switch in exporting mode), and policy intervention (before or
after the WTO accession). All time and individual fixed effects are captured by
{d200j, ci} in our fixed-effect panel regression. The remaining terms in the re-
gression are the double interaction term of treatment and WTO accession (which
28In China, the market share of these big state banks in total bank credits was basically de-
clining, which was a natural outcome following the gradual financial reforms since the 1990s.
Primarily completed financial reforms include the promulgation of the Commercial Bank Law
that provides a legal basis for changing the specialized state banks to state-owned commercial
banks. It also meant the transformation of the share holding system in the four biggest state-
owned banks, which helped establish a standardized corporate governance and an internal system
of rights and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements for modern commercial banks.
Other reforms like establishing privately owned small banks, accelerating interest rate liberal-
ization, developing a deposit insurance scheme and improving financial institutions’ market exit
mechanism are already well underway.
23
characterizes the time variation in the treatment of interest) and the term for
treatment per se. The dummy variable WTOt captures the impact of China’s
policy change in exporting mode induced by the WTO accession; it equals 1 if the
year is after 2001 (or 2002, or 2003, depending on how we divide the sample into
pre- and post-WTO accession periods, since the trade deregulation was phased in
rather than once for all). The variable dExportingmodei × dWTOt will be 1 if
a firm switched from indirect to direct exporting and the year is later than 2001
(or 2002, or 2003). The coefficient τ3 measures the difference in average treat-
ment effect promoted by financial credits before and after China’s WTO accession
across firms, i.e. the time-varying treatment effect promoted by finance. Again,
we estimate the empirical equation above using the fixed-effect (FE) panel data
methods to control for firm-level fixed effects and control for the endogeneity is-
sue in switching exporting modes by using the instrumental variable method we
introduced above.
4. Baseline Results and Robustness Checks
This section presents and discusses the empirical results of this paper. We begin
with the panel data difference-in-differences estimation to show the increasing role
of finance in promoting firm-level exports and productivity when a firm switches
its exporting mode from indirect to direct export.29 Next, we employ panel data
difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation to examine how the role played
29To account for the potential endogeneity issue of financial credits, we proxy the current
value of finance by its first-order lagged value in all baseline estimations. We will further explore
this issue using province-sector-level financial variables. Moreover, it is worthy to point out that
we take log values for all continuous variables in our regressions.
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by finance on switching firms varies over time, especially before and after China’s
WTO accession. For both types of estimation, we include the results with and
without the instrumental variable to account for the endogeneity issue in switching
exporting mode.
4.1. Panel Data Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Tables 4 and 5 show the difference-in-differences estimation results for firm-level
export value with internal and external finance. We estimate four scenarios dis-
tinguished by two dimensions, that is, whether the switch in exporting mode is
instrumented and whether firms’ age and size (measured by firms’ capital stock)
are controlled for. As the young and small firms tend to rely more on financial
credits to grow, we control for firm age and firm size to isolate the impact of export
mode switching on firms’ export performance.30 Column 1 and 2 of Tables 4 and
5 present results for the scenarios without instrumenting the switch in exporting
mode. It turns out that the estimates are barely changed when we control for
firms’ age and size. The estimates show that there is a significant increase in the
role of financial credits in encouraging firm’s export value when the firm switches
from indirect to direct exporting. Specifically, a 10% increase in internal (resp.
external) finance in promoting firms’ export value on average increases by 1.10%
(resp. 1.72%) when the firm switches its exporting mode. Columns 3 and 4 indi-
cate that after instrumenting the switching in exporting mode with the product
of firm initial productivity and province-level capital supply shock, the average
30In all estimations, we also control for the yearly aggregate effect that would cause the
changes in the difference-in-differences or difference-in-difference-in-differences estimates even in
the absence of treatment, i.e. the switch in exporting mode.
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encouraging effect is even larger. Specifically, a 10% increase in internal (resp. ex-
ternal) finance boosts firm-level export value by 4.33% (resp. 2.93%) (controlling
for firms’ age and size makes no difference).31
The difference-in-differences estimation results for firm-level productivity with
internal and external finance are presented in Tables 6 and 7. We consider the
same four scenarios as in Tables 4 and 5. Also the estimates show that the increase
in the encouraging effect of finance in promoting firms’ productivity is both sta-
tistically and economically significant. In the scenarios without the instrumental
variable for the switch in exporting mode (columns 1 and 2 of Tables 6 and 7), a
10% rise in internal (resp. external) finance on average increases firms’ productiv-
ity by 0.14% (resp. 0.06%). If we use the instrumental variable, it indicates that
the increase in firms’ productivity will be 0.78% (resp. 0.66%), which is substan-
tially larger than the OLS (ordinary least squares) estimates. Compared to the
magnitudes for export values, it is suggestive that there is not a perfect transmis-
sion (i.e. incomplete pass-through) from the increase in firms’ export value to that
in productivity even though the transmission channel is positive.
Before moving on to the comparison between internal and external finance, we
find it necessary to discuss the difference between OLS and IV estimates in Tables
4-7. A salient pattern in these tables is that the IV estimates are much larger than
31We implement the weak-identification test for all estimations with instrumental variables
to address the potential weak-instrument problem following the routines proposed by Baum et
al. (2007). As they suggest, it is better to use the robust analog of the Cragg-Donald (1993) F
statistic, i.e. the rk Wald F statistic to replace the original Cragg-Donald F statistic. Though
there does not exist a test for weak instruments in the presence of non-i.i.d. disturbances, the rk
Wald F statistic is a sensible option as it is the state-of-the-art in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity, autocorrelation, or clustering. All of our IV estimations pass the weak-identification test,
as the rk Wald F statistics are far larger than 10, which not only surpasses the critical values
compiled by Stock and Yogo (2005) but also conforms to the “rule of thumb” of Staiger and
Stock (1997).
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OLS estimates, with an inflation even more than fivefold in the case of productivity.
We ascribe this difference to the fact that the instrumental variable method assigns
more weights on firms that expect large gains from switching exporting modes
and accumulating finance, thus inflating the average treatment effect from firm-
specific or heterogeneous causal impact. To be specific, following the logic revealed
in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and a recent application by Lileeva and Trefler
(2010), we write the average treatment effect from OLS estimation as τ + E(U),
where τ is the same for all firms and U is the firm-specific or heterogeneous causal
impact. Differently, the (local) average treatment effect from IV estimation can
be written as τ +
(
E(U ×∆p)/E(∆p)), where ∆p is the change in probability of
switching exporting modes induced by the instrumental variable in the first stage
estimation. ∆p acts as the weight used to average U across firms. In the OLS case,
the weight is the same across all firms since E(U) is estimated just using simple
sample average. Yet, the IV estimation puts more weight on firms that expect to
gain substantially from switching exporting modes and accumulating finance, thus(
E(U ×∆p)/E(∆p)) > E(U).
Noticeably, the difference-in-differences estimates in the internal and external
finance cases are strikingly different. As for the export values, the IV estimation
in Tables 4 and 5 shows that the case of internal finance produces much larger
estimates. In specific, it turns out that the effect of a 10% increase in internal
finance in promoting firm’s export value on average increases by 1.81% (4.38%
minus 2.57%) more than that of external finance when the firm switches export-
ing mode. This finding is consistent with the argument in Manova et al. (2015)
that direct exporters are believed to be more dependent on outside funds than
indirect exporters and domestic producers, in order to cover large entry and fixed
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costs when entering international markets. Take a representative firm as an ex-
ample, it incurs large upfront entry and fixed costs (like studying the profitability
of potential markets, product adjustment, and setting up distributional networks)
when starting to export directly. Those once-for-all (to some extent at least) pre-
payments are substantial and could not be covered in general by firms’ retained
earnings or internal cash flows from routine operations. As a result, direct ex-
porters typically rely more heavily on outside rather than internal financing to
prepay entry and fixed costs. Alternatively, it means that external credit is more
crucial in financing for entry and fixed costs of direct exporting. The variable cost-
s of direct exporting (such as intermediate input, salaries, and equipment rental
fees), however, are much less massive in a short time window, which leaves plen-
tiful room for internal finance to take effect. Since export value is a flow variable
and the associated costs are variable costs, we should expect internal finance will
have a larger impact than external finance. Our difference-in-differences estimates
provide solid support for this argument.
As for the productivity, Tables 6 and 7 show that the internal finance case pro-
duces much greater estimates again. To be specific, it turns out that a 10% increase
in internal finance promotes firm’s productivity on average by 0.12% (0.78% minus
0.66%) more than that of external finance when the firm switches its exporting
mode. This is consistent with the case for export values above. We find two rea-
sons are potentially responsible for the smaller promoting role of external finance
in raising firms’ productivity. First, as more external finance is allocated to cover
entry and fixed costs, most of the increase in external finance cannot be counted
as capital. It in turn means that the external finance is primarily not relevant
for firms’ production process, at least in a sense of direct relevance. Second, even
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though some part of the external finance that is used in exporting could be count-
ed as capital (like the part for making market-specific investments in capacity and
product adjustment), it basically helps firms upgrade product composition rather
than directly helping firms produce more products. Since our revenue productiv-
ity measure cannot reflect the upgrade in product composition, external finance
exhibits a smaller promoting role in our regressions.
4.2. Panel Data Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Es-
timates
In Tables 8 and 9, we report the results for the difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimation of export value with financial credits.32 To save space, we report only
the IV estimation results. Estimations capture the changes in the promoted im-
pact of treatment (firm switches from indirect into direct exporter) by finance on
firms’ exporting value before and after China’s WTO accession. Since the WTO
accession and associated trade deregulation was phased in, we consider different
threshold years to divide our whole sample (2000-2006) into pre- and post-WTO
accession periods. Specifically, as discussed in the policy background, we consid-
er three threshold years: 2002, 2003, and 2004. Above all, Tables 8 and 9 show
that the estimates basically remain unchanged when we control for firms’ age and
size. Specifically, we find an increasing treatment effect of finance on switchers’
32Since we concentrate on investigating the time-varying impact of finance on firm export
performance in this study, to save space, we do not present DDD estimates for firm productivity
as we do so for the DID case. However, it is necessary to mention that we get negative DDD
estimates for productivity, which can be rationalized via a “negative selection” proposed by
Lileeva and Trefler (2010). It basically says that when initially more productive PDEs switch to
direct exporting in the post-WTO accession, productivity growth is expected to be slower.
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exports, i.e. relative to exporters that switch their exporting mode in the pre-
WTO accession period, financial credits increase firm-level exports more for firms
that switch exporting mode in the post-WTO accession period, no matter how we
distinguish pre- and post-WTO accession periods. This increase in the augmented
treatment effect by finance substantiates the time-varying hypothesis of this pa-
per. Export distortion is a possible interpretation for the time-varying impact of
financial credits: i.e., in the pre-WTO accession period, export licenses in favor
of larger and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). At the meanwhile, more productive
but financially constrained PDEs have to export through intermediaries.33 Switch-
ers are less financial constraint firms, but not necessary firms that expect larger
export or productivity growth after switching export mode. When the distortion
has been alleviated in the post-WTO accession period, firms that expect larger
export growth switch their exporting mode, which leads to an increasing impact
of financial credits.
Tables 8 and 9 also show that the increase in the promoting effect of finance
on firms’ exporting value is larger when we choose an earlier threshold year to
divide our sample into pre- and post-WTO accession periods. If we treat 2002-
2006 as the post-WTO accession period, the treatment effect on firm’s export
value augmented by doubling internal (resp. external) finance will be on average
quadrupled (resp. ninefold) when the firm is observed switching in the post-WTO
accession period rather than in the pre-WTO accession period. More specifically,
conditioning on that a firm switches exporting mode, a 10% increase in firm-level
33Khandelwal et al. (2013) find that before the quota removal of textile and cloth products in
China, SOEs are more likely to obtain quotas than other firms, but they are featured with low
production efficiency.
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internal (resp. external) finance on average leads to a 38.97% (resp. 86.63%)
more export sales in the post-WTO accession period if we set the threshold year
to 2001. When we postpone the threshold year to 2003, the average increase in
export values promoted by a 10% increase in internal (resp. external) finance falls
substantially to 9.84% (resp. 27.69%). And it is further decreases to 6.18% (resp.
26.24%) if the threshold year is 2004 for the internal (resp. external) finance case.
The differences resulting from the choice of the critical years are related to the
fact that China’s deregulation in direct exporting rights is a gradual process.34
It allowed different groups of firms to satisfy the direct exporting requirement in
each year. As discussed in Section 2, the registered capital requirement in direct
exporting for PDEs dropped dramatically from 8.5 million yuan (or 5 million yuan
if the firm was publicly owned) to 3 million yuan in 2001, which grants a great
number of PDEs to be eligible to export directly in our sample. When those
credit-constrained PDEs started to export directly in 2002, they were enormously
more in need of finance than previous direct exporters that were primarily non-
constrained SOEs. As a consequence, a boost in the encouraging role of finance
on firm exporting value occurs when many PDEs were enfranchised to export
for the first time. The encouraging role then fell quickly in later years because
the further deregulation just released more PDEs with lower registered capital to
export directly. Those PDEs essentially were similar as the enfranchised PDEs in
2002, though a bit more credit constrained due to their smaller scale and thus still
generating positive estimates when a later critical year is chosen.
One surprise is that we observe a higher increase in the promoting role of
34It is equivalent to treating the elimination of export distortion as a gradual process.
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external finance than internal finance in our difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimation for export values, no matter how we choose the threshold year for
dividing pre- and post-WTO accession periods. Since the difference is along the
time dimension, it might reflect that firms’ access to internal finance was self-
determined and largely unchanged in pre- and post-WTO accession periods, yet
the access to external finance has been greatly improved with concurrent financial
reforms. The relaxation in acquiring banking and trade credits thus provides a
greater possibility for external finance to make a contribution.
In the next subsection, we attempt to disentangle the mechanism through which
financial credits exhibit the heterogeneous impact on firms’ export performance.
4.3. Utilization of Finance Matters
In this section, we investigate the firm-level heterogeneous efficiency in utilizing
finance to uncover the mechanism that results in our difference-in-differences and
difference-in-difference-in-differences regression results. To this end, we construct
four types of measure related to firms’ usage of finance, and check how they change
when firms engage in switching from indirect to direct exporting.
Working capital management has long been regarded as an effective way to
increase firms’ profitability (e.g., Shin and Soenen, 1998; Petersen and Rajan, 1997;
Deloof, 2003; Eljelly, 2004). The four measures that characterize the efficiency
of firms’ usage of finance are current liquidity ratio, receivable turnover ratio,
inventory turnover ratio, and operation cycle (Eljelly, 2004; Ding et al., 2013).
(1). Current liquidity ratio (CLit) is the ratio of liquid liability (LLit) to liquid
assets (LAit), i.e. CLit =
LLit
LAit
expresses a company’s ability to repay short-term
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creditors out of its total cash. A lower liquidity ratio indicates that a company is
more liquid and has better coverage of outstanding debts, thus suggesting a higher
efficiency in managing liquidity. (2). Receivable turnover ratio (RTit) is the ratio
of net credit sales (NCSit) to average accounts receivable (ARit) in previous and
current periods, i.e. RTit = 2× NCSitARi,t−1+ARit . It quantifies a firm’s effectiveness in
extending credit and in collecting debts on that credit. The receivable turnover
ratio is an activity ratio measuring how efficiently a firm uses its assets. (3).
Inventory turnover ratio (ITit) is defined as current sales (Sit) divided by average
inventory (INit) in recent two periods, i.e. ITit = 2 × SitINi,t−1+INit . It is a ratio
showing how many times a company’s inventory is sold and replaced over a single
period. A high turnover implies strong sales and, therefore, weak inventory, which
then indicates that the firm is more efficient at generating returns from its assets
and thus maintaining healthy financial conditions. (4). Operation cycle (OCit) is
the sum of two parts, days receivables outstanding and days inventory outstanding
within a year, that is, OCit =
365
RTit
+ 365
ITit
. It is also known as the cash conversion
cycle, measuring how long a firm takes to convert it sales into cash holdings. A
shorter operation cycle means better management performance and more efficiency
in utilizing cash.
Figure 3 plots the dynamic paths of four financial variables defined above. It
shows that, over the period 2001-2004 when the trade deregulation on direct ex-
porting rights phased in, switchers exhibit higher efficiency and larger efficiency
gains in finance usage than indirect exporters, where switchers are firms switching
from indirect to direct exporters while non-switchers are constant indirect ex-
porters. In specific, switchers not only have lower liquidity ratio but also exhibit
a steeper decline than non-switchers, from 1.08 to 1.04 versus from 1.10 to 1.09.
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Similar patterns apply to inventory turnover ratio and operation cycle. Switchers
have a higher inventory turnover ratio and shorter operation cycle. They also ex-
perience a steeper increase in their inventory turnover ratio and more significant
drop in operation cycle. One exception is that the receivable turnover rate diver-
gence between switchers and non-switchers occurs after 2005, rather than over the
phase-in period of 2001-2004. This might be caused by the aggressive expansion
of direct exporters when the direct exporting was fully liberalized. In that case,
direct exporters tend to sell aggressively even when they cannot receive payments
immediately, which then leads to massively accumulated accounts receivable and
suppresses the receivable turnover ratio.
We further run panel data difference-in-differences regressions for all the four
types of financial variables. As in the baseline case, the treatment is defined as
the switch from indirect to direct exporting. Results are reported in Table 10. It
reveals that exporters experience lower liquidity ratios, higher inventory turnover,
and operation cycle when they switch from indirect to directing exporting, in
comparison with the case where firms continue as constant indirect exporters. As
for the receivable turnover rate, the treated group barely gains any efficiency. The
coefficient is not significant, neither statistically nor economically.
The efficiency measures of finance utilization strongly suggest that switchers
are better users of financial credits, which helps to explain the positive average
treatment effect in our DID regressions. This finding is highly consistent with the
learning channel for direct exporters. First, switchers need to effectively utilize
finance to support the learning process. After switching into direct exporting,
firms have access to frequent contacts with foreign consumers and producers (see
Egan and Mody (1992) for more details), which encourages them to better design
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products and raise competitiveness via technology upgrading. All the learning
activities require support from more finance, thus in turn urging firms to more
efficiently exploit existing financial credits that typically are scare when firms are
serving international markets. Second, direct exporting brings about better growth
opportunities for productivity and demand, the higher expected returns also spur
switchers to hike finance utilization rates. Bai et al. (2017) demonstrate that direct
exporting generates much more favorable productivity and demand evolution for
switchers. In that case, a profit-maximizing firm will naturally be incentivized to
speed the velocity of financial credits so that it can reap more future benefits from
exporting given a fixed amount of financial credits.
The channel of finance utilization also works well to explain our main find-
ings in the panel data difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation. Relative
to continuing indirect exporters, firms that switch their exporting mode from in-
direct to direct export, on average, have higher efficiency in utilizing finance. As
such, we would expect a higher efficiency gain in the post-WTO accession period
when more PDEs participated in this type of switch, since these PDEs are firms
which are financial constrained but have large expected export or productivity
growth after switching from indirect to direct exporting. This type of switchers
has higher efficiency in finance usage. When finance is more difficult to acquire
for PDE firms, we also naturally anticipate that they would even more efficiently
utilize financial credits. The ulteriorly increased efficiency in utilizing finance thus
lends support for our time-varying finding that the encouraging effect of finance
on firm exporting is further heightened in the post-WTO accession period.
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4.4. Robustness Checks
We further check the robustness of our baseline results above in this subsection. We
shall show that a more rigorous proxy for endogenous firm-level financial credits
that captures relatively exogenous variation in these variables does not change
our main findings. We follow the idea of Manova et al. (2015) to proxy firm-level
internal and external finance with sectoral counterparts. We expand it to province-
sector-level proxies to generate more reasonable variation in finance, which can
then be employed to identify the augmented treatment effect from firms’ financial
credits.
Tables 11-12 tabulate the panel data difference-in-differences estimates for ex-
port value, comparable to Tables 4-5. It is revealed that proxy firm-level finance
using province-sector level counterparts marginally change our baseline results.
The statistical significance keeps unchanged and economic magnitude is just s-
lightly changed. We still have the conclusion that on average the encouraging
effect of finance on firms’ export value increases when a firm switches its export-
ing mode, and the results are robust to including more controls like age and size,
and instrument the potentially endogenous treatment with the product of firm’s
initial productivity and provincial capital supply shock. Tables 13-14 confirm the
robustness of our baseline results in Tables 6-7 for firms’ productivity, i.e. TFPR.
They exhibit marginally changed estimates, and the main conclusion we drew pre-
viously still holds, that the encouraging effect of finance on productivity is higher
when the firms engage into the switch from indirect to direct exporting. Moreover,
it still shows an incomplete pass-through from gains in export value to gains in
productivity.
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In Tables 15-16, we present the panel data difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimates using province-sector-level proxies for firm-level financial credits. The
results are highly comparable to those in Tables 8-9, with only a sensible change
in magnitudes. It reinforces our baseline finding that the increased encouraging
effect of finance on firm’s export value and productivity is higher when the firm
switches from indirect into direct exporter and if the firm is observed in the post-
WTO accession period. The results are robust to how we separate pre- and post-
WTO accession periods. It also underscores a declining difference-in-difference-in-
differences estimate when we choose a later cutoff year to separate pre- and post-
WTO accession periods, which essentially reflects the phase-in feature of China’s
deregulation on directing exporting rights.
5. Conclusions
This paper examines the time-varying feature of the impacts of finance on firm
exporting behaviors when a firm switches from indirect to direct exporting mode
in the context of China’s WTO accession. To fulfill WTO accession commitments,
China gradually lifted the restriction in direct exporting rights over the period
2001-2004. It is noticeable that the regulation on exporting modes primarily in-
hibited PDEs from exporting directly while more SOEs were exempted, as their
registered capital requirements were quite different. Direct exporters feature more
favorable future outcomes, e.g. productivity and demand stock growth (Bai et al.,
2017). Using panel survey data, we show that financial credits improve the firm-
level exports and productivity more for firms that switch from indirect to direct
exporting. Knowing that PDE firms were typically credit constrained, we conjec-
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ture that the impact of financial credits on firm exports when the firm switches
from indirect to direct exporting mode would be larger after China’s WTO ac-
cession. This is because that many more PDEs were granted the opportunity to
engage in direct exporting and the direct exporting typically incurs massive ad-
ditional fixed/variable costs cost as well as subsequent investment in upgrading
technology.
Using a panel data difference-in-difference-in-differences approach combined
with instrumental variable methods to control for potential endogeneity issues
associated with the switch in exporting modes, we find strong evidence to sub-
stantiate our time-varying hypothesis. The difference-in-difference-in-differences
estimation produces a further increase in the role of finance in promoting firms’
export value in the post-WTO accession period. The main results remain un-
changed after controlling for possible endogeneities.
Though we are focusing on the time-varying impact of finance on firm perfor-
mance, our work has strong implications in two dimensions. First, we show the
heterogeneous impact of financial credits on different firms. We demonstrate that
finance could make a pivotal contribution to firm-level exports and productivity
growth when firms have a higher efficiency in finance usage. Second, our study im-
plies additional welfare gains of trade liberalization. Our empirical findings suggest
that when distortions exist, trade liberalization is an effective way to eliminate the
distortion. Further, the elimination of distortions makes financial markets play a
more pronounced role in improving firm-level exports, which results in additional
welfare gains as export share further increases.
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Figure 1: Share and average productivity of private domestic firms in the pool of direct exporters, 2001-2006.
Notes. The red dash line confines the period when China lifted its regulation on direct exporting rights,
that is, 2004.
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Part I: Main Story of Our Work
⇓
Explained Variable: Exporting Values
↓
Treatment Effect
Treatment Group: Indirect Exporters Who Switch to Direct Ones
Control Group: Indirect Exporters Who Remain as Indirect Ones
↓
Goal 1: Exploring How Finance Affects the Treatment Effect
↓
Methodology: Panel-data DID Method Is Applied
↓
Goal 2: Exploring How the Effect of Finance above Is Affected by the WTO Accession
Pre-WTO Accession: Many PDEs Are Not Allowed To Export Directly
Post-WTO Accession: More PDEs Are Allowed To Export Directly
↓
Methodology: Panel-data DDD Method Is Appliedww
Part II: Main Results of Our Work
⇓
Contribution 1: We Identify an Augmented Treatment Effect on the Treated Where Finance Promotes
More Exports for Firms When They Switch from Indirect to Direct Exporting
↓
Contribution 2: We Reveal That the Encouraging Effect of Finance for the Treated Group is Greater
after China’s WTO Accession When More PDE Firms Are Engaged in Direct Exporting
Figure 2: The Main Idea and Contributions of Our Work.
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Figure 3: Four measures of firms’ efficiency in utilizing finance, 2001-2006.
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the construction of receivable turnover ratio and inventory turnover ratio requires lagged variables, the
four financial variables start from 2001.
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Table 1: Basic Statistical Summary of the ASIP Data set
Year Number of Number of TFPR TFPR of Value Value Added of Employment Capital Intermediate
Firms Exporters Exporters Added Exporters Value Stock Input
2000 146,898 36,759 1.46 1.62 14,105 28,573 354 25,247 39,597
2001 153,958 39,997 1.55 1.71 14,833 28,992 296 24,348 41,570
2002 165,491 44,886 1.64 1.77 16,600 31,738 287 24,274 45,893
2003 180,696 50,534 1.73 1.83 19,410 37,006 276 24,294 55,254
2004 258,390 76,482 1.79 1.88 17,235 31,645 224 20,400 49,465
2005 250,467 74,250 1.85 1.91 21,492 38,993 240 24,123 59,697
2006 278,014 78,052 1.9 1.95 24,101 45,515 229 25,227 65,822
Notes. As in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), TFPR is dimensionless; value added is measured in thousand
yuan; labor is measured in persons; capital and intermediate inputs are measured in thousand yuan.
Table 2: Basic Statistical Summary of the Customs Data set
Year Number of Number of Export Total Average Number of
Observations Firms Value Destinations Destinations Products
2000 1,882,359 62,746 29,6791.4 213 6.9 30
2001 2,121,515 68,487 286,292.2 222 7.3 30.9
2002 2,613,005 78,612 270,810.7 222 7.5 33.2
2003 3,243,538 95,686 276,459.1 220 7.8 33.9
2004 4,029,789 120,590 297,836.6 220 8.3 33.4
2005 5,103,048 144,030 298,019.1 221 8.3 35.4
2006 6,187,856 171,144 301,018.7 220 8.1 36.2
Notes. Export value is measured in thousand yuan.
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Table 3: Three Types of Firms in the Matched Dataset
Year Exporting Number of Mean Custom Export Average
Mode Firms TFPR Value Destinations
2000 Direct 15,639 1.63 55,120.52 6.46
Indirect 21,120 1.47 26,580.81
Nonexporters 106,994 1.37
2001 Direct 17,957 1.71 55,482.69 7.00
Indirect 22,040 1.53 26,678.49
Nonexporters 110,188 1.48
2002 Direct 21,157 1.77 60,235.41 7.66
Indirect 23,729 1.65 29,911.51
Nonexporters 115,891 1.57
2003 Direct 25,392 1.85 68,748.30 8.27
Indirect 25,142 1.74 37,509.51
Nonexporters 124,233 1.66
2004 Direct 41,392 1.88 64,746.70 8.09
Indirect 37,431 1.81 37,237.03
Nonexporters 174,321 1.73
2005 Direct 38,683 1.93 78,127.19 9.21
Indirect 35,567 1.85 47,413.39
Nonexporters 166,285 1.78
2006 Direct 41,944 1.97 90,630.63 9.81
Indirect 36,109 1.91 61,387.64
Nonexporters 188,714 1.84
Notes. As in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), TFPR is dimensionless; custom export value is measured in
thousand yuan.
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Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for Export Value with Internal Finance
Dependent Variable (horizontal) Export Value Export Value Export Value Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dExportingmode × 0.1096*** 0.1097***
internalfinance [0.0376] [0.0376]
dExportingmode IV × 0.4261** 0.4332**
internalfinance [0.2109] [0.2168]
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Age NO YES NO YES
Size NO YES NO YES
R Squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Number of Observations 25,728 25,721 25,576 25,569
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for Export Value with External Finance
Dependent Variable (horizontal) Export Value Export Value Export Value Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dExportingmode × 0.1728*** 0.1723***
externalfinance [0.0291] [0.0291]
dExportingmode IV × 0.2892** 0.2931**
externalfinance [0.1358] [0.1439]
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Age NO YES NO YES
Size NO YES NO YES
R Squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Number of Observations 25,602 25,594 25,476 25,468
Notes. Robust standard errors in bracket; export value is measured in thousand yuan; year-fixed effect
is a linear combination of year dummies for 2001-2006; size is measured by firms’ capital stock; dExport-
ingmode IV is constructed as the product of firm-level initial productivity and province-level aggregate
capital supply shock; *, *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 6: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for TFPR with Internal Finance
Dependent Variable (→) TFPR TFPR TFPR TFPR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dExportingmode × 0.0144*** 0.0142***
internalfinance [0.0047] [0.0047]
dExportingmode IV × 0.0778*** 0.0783***
internalfinance [0.0084] [0.0084]
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Age NO YES NO YES
Size NO YES NO YES
R Squared 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
Number of Observations 37,630 37,618 37,438 37,426
Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for TFPR with External Finance
Dependent Variable (→) TFPR TFPR TFPR TFPR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dExportingmode × 0.0064* 0.0064*
externalfinance [0.0037] [0.0037]
dExportingmode IV × 0.0655*** 0.0659***
externalfinance [0.0072] [0.0072]
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Age NO YES NO YES
Size NO YES NO YES
R Squared 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Number of Observations 37,460 37,447 37,274 37,261
Notes. Robust standard errors in bracket; TFPR is dimensionless; year-fixed effect is a linear combination
of year dummies for 2001-2006; size is measured by firms’ capital stock; dExportingmode IV is constructed
as the product of firm-level initial productivity and province-level aggregate capital supply shock; *, ***
indicate significance at the 10% and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 10: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for Export Value with Internal Finance
Dependent Variable Liquidity Receivable Turnover Inventory Turnover Operation Cycle
(horizontal) (1) (2) (3) (4)
dExportingmode -0.0218** 0.0026 0.0534*** -0.0322***
[0.0107] [0.0130] [0.0127] [0.0094]
Export Share -0.0002 -0.0006*** -0.0008*** 0.0007***
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001]
Constant 0.1516*** 1.6130*** 1.2711*** 5.3167***
[0.0149] [0.0181] [0.0177] [0.0132]
R Squared 0.16 0.09 1.14 0.08
Number of Observations 9,830 9,853 9,853 9,853
Notes. Robust standard errors in bracket; export share is the share of exports in firms’ total sales, included
to control for the level of involvement in international markets after the entry into direct exporting; age,
size and year fixed effect have been controlled for all regressions; **, *** indicate significance at the 5%
and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 11: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for Export Value with Internal Finance Proxy
Dependent Variable (horizontal) Export Value Export Value Export Value Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dExportingmode × 0.1005*** 0.1006***
internalfinance [0.0123] [0.0124]
dExportingmode IV × 0.4019* 0.4084*
internalfinance [0.2163] [0.2165]
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Age NO YES NO YES
Size NO YES NO YES
R Squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Number of Observations 25,728 25,721 25,593 25,586
Table 12: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for Export Value with External Finance Proxy
Dependent Variable (horizontal) Export Value Export Value Export Value Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dExportingmode × 0.1213*** 0.1212***
externalfinance [0.0087] [0.0087]
dExportingmode IV × 0.2934* 0.2967*
externalfinance [0.1766] [0.1797]
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Age NO YES NO YES
Size NO YES NO YES
R Squared 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15
Number of Observations 25,602 25,594 25,470 25,462
Notes. Robust standard errors in bracket; export value is measured in thousand yuan; internal and external
finance are proxied by province-sector-level aggregate of firm-level counterparts; year fixed effect is a linear
combination of year dummies for 2001-2006; size is measured by firms’ capital stock; dExportingmode IV
is constructed as the product of firm-level initial productivity and province-level aggregate capital supply
shock; *, *** indicates significance at the 10% and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 13: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for TFPR with Internal Finance Proxy
Dependent Variable (→) TFPR TFPR TFPR TFPR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dExportingmode × 0.0232*** 0.0237***
internalfinance [0.0073] [0.0073]
dExportingmode IV × 0.0757*** 0.0762***
internalfinance [0.0082] [0.0082]
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Age NO YES NO YES
Size NO YES NO YES
R Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Number of Observations 37,630 37,618 37,438 37,426
Table 14: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for TFPR with External Finance Proxy
Dependent Variable (→) TFPR TFPR TFPR TFPR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dExportingmode × 0.0137** 0.0140**
externalfinance [0.0060] [0.0061]
dExportingmode IV × 0.0629*** 0.0633***
externalfinance [0.0069] [0.0068]
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Age NO YES NO YES
Size NO YES NO YES
R Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Number of Observations 37,460 37,447 37,274 37,261
Notes. Robust standard errors in bracket; TFPR is dimensionless; internal and external finance are proxied
by province-sector-level aggregate of firm-level counterparts; year fixed effect is a linear combination of
year dummies for 2001-2006; size is measured by firms’ capital stock; dExportingmode IV is constructed
as the product of firm-level initial productivity and province-level aggregate capital supply shock; **, ***
indicates significance at the 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Appendices (Not for Publication)
Matching Procedure for Manufacturing and Customs Data
We match Chinese manufacturing survey data (ASIP) and Customs data using the following
procedure. This algorithm produces highly comparable results to the existing studies, like
Manova and Yu (2016).
Step 1. Given the potential existence of typographical errors in both data sets, we clean the
data sets using a conservative approach. In the Customs data set, we use the non-missing modes
(i.e. the most frequent value) of party id, zip code, and telephone number of the monthly data
as the annual value for our matching purpose. In both annual data sets, if the identifier or
“concatenation of zip code and telephone number” exists more than once, we discard all the
observations to avoid the case that an identifier in one data set might link to multiple identifiers
in the other data set. Less than 0.01% of the observations are dropped each year due to these
typographical errors.
Step 2.To get the identifier concordance, we first match firms’ Chinese name of the two data
sets if the same names appear in both data sets in the same year. This provides the most
reliable matching results. Then we add concordances if the same name shows up in different
years of the two data sets, which might be due to delays in information updating. If the second
match generates a different identifier concordance from the first match, we dropped the second
matched result.
Step 3. We follow the same procedure in Step 2 for the “concatenation of zip code and
telephone” for the two data sets. Again we think that the matches from the same year are
more reliable than matches from different years.
Step 4. The order of confidence in the concordance is: same names in the same year, same
telephone number and zip code in the same year, same names in different years, and same
telephone number and zip code in the different years. Every time the latter matches generate
a different identifier concordance from the earlier matches, we use the earlier matched results.
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